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MAPP v. OHIO: PANDORA'S PROBLEMS
FOR THE PROSECUTOR
ABLEN SPECTER t
Police practices and prosecution procedures were revolutionized
in many states by the holding of the Supreme Court of the United
States in Mapp v. Ohio that evidence obtained from an illegal search
and seizure cannot be used in a state criminal proceeding.' The experiences of law enforcement officials in Philadelphia and recent decisions of many state appellate courts indicate that the imposition of
the exclusionary rule upon the states is the most significant event in
criminal law since the adoption of the fourteenth amendment. In
the past quarter century state criminal procedures have frequently been
affected by the expanding interpretation of the due process clause of
the fourteenth amendment; but Mapp has rewritten the criminal trial
treatise for states which had admitted evidence regardless of how it
was obtained.
Extreme consequences have been experienced in former nonexclusionary jurisdictions. The Annual Report of the New York
City Magistrates' Courts disclosed that gambling cases dropped thirtyfive percent in the year following the ruling in Mapp, a statistical
change which is attributed to that decision.' A similar result has
occurred in Philadelphia, although specific figures are not available.
According to the New York report, the larger number of warrants
necessitated by the new ruling has so substantially increased the work
of the magistrates' courts that a separate division will probably be
required.3 In Philadelphia the trial courts, as well as the magistrates'
courts, have been inundated by the flood of problems on warrants and
motions to suppress resulting from Mapp.
The initial reaction in the Pennsylvania courts was one of dismay.
The Superior Court characterized Mapp v. Ohio as a "hurricane"
which "swept over our fair land last June." ' One Philadelphia trial
court judge was so surprised by the Mapp holding that he said it applied only to Ohio as far as he was concerned until the Pennsylvania
t Assistant District Attorney, Chief of the Appeals Division, Philadelphia County,
Pennsylvania. A.B. 1951, University of Pennsylvania; LL.B. 1956, Yale University.
1367 U.S. 643 (1961).
2 N.Y. Times, July 16, 1962, page 1, col. 2.
3 Ibid.
4 Commonwealth v. One 1955 Buick Sedan, 198 Pa. Super. 133, 135 (1962).
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appellate courts told him otherwise. Another Philadelphia County
judge, when first confronted with Mapp, refused to follow it, reasoning
that the new interpretation came from a divided court, and he agreed
with the dissenters. A distinguished Pennsylvania jurist and author
on criminal procedure questioned "the logic of or the justification for
Mapp." 5

In the first days after Mapp, law enforcement officials in Philadelphia were uncertain as to what course to take. Policemen, who
for years had presented their evidence in court without any regard
to how it had been obtained, could not understand the subtleties of
what constituted a legal search and seizure. When some Philadelphia
trial judges applied principles from liberal federal decisions on search
and seizure, the vice-squad detective and the policeman on the beat
could understand neither the logic of what had been decided nor the
formula for how to act in the future in order to obtain admissible evidence. One enforcement officer of the Pennsylvania Liquor Control
Board turned a phrase on a century old case and called the new
national exclusionary rule the "dread Mapp decision."
The defense bar shared in the confusion, but not in the gloom.
Cases which appeared hopeless in May of 1961 were won in July, when
key evidence was excluded because "the constable had blundered."
Within three months after Mapp was decided, the Philadelphia District Attorney's Office circulated a twenty-five page memorandum on
the law of search and seizure. While the analysis of cases in the
federal courts and the exclusionary states was of some assistance, the
memorandum was too long and complicated for the police to digest
and too short and shallow to provide answers for the vast majority
of problems faced by the Philadelphia trial courts in their efforts to
reconcile Mapp with the administration of justice in a metropolis faced
with major problems of law enforcement.
The avalanche of search and seizure cases since Mapp has produced procedures and principles of law to guide those states which
once admitted unconstitutionally seized evidence. Many state appellate courts have sought to interpret the effect of the new federal rule
on their state practices. The crucial impact of Mapp, however, has
doubtless been felt in the trial courts and at preliminary hearings in
magistrates' courts. Only a small percentage of trial court decisions
are reported and, except for scattered observations on magistrates' actions in preliminary hearings, the experience at that level is virtually
totally lost.
5 Commonwealth v. Griffith, No. 294, May 1962 Sess., Erie County, Pa., Ct. of
Quart. Sess., June 21, 1962, p. 2 n.3 (opinion of Burton R. Laub, J.).
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It is unfortunate that the search and seizure case law at preliminary hearings and in the trial courts cannot be comprehensively
catalogued in order to provide precedents for future decisions, and
even more importantly, to serve as a basis for evaluating the policy
and social justifications for a far reaching decision like Mapp v. Ohio.
That decision might be reconsidered if sufficient recorded experience
were available to illuminate the practical day-by-day consequences of
the exclusionary principle.
To shed some light on Mapp's impact on law enforcement in a major city and state which had formerly admitted evidence regardless of
the method of seizure, this Article will concentrate on the grass-roots experience in Philadelphia and the reaction, in oral argument as well as
written decision, of the Pennsylvania appellate courts. Such an
analysis is possible because the Appeals Division of the Philadelphia
District Attorney's Office has handled the search and seizure problems
as they arose on pretrial motions as well as in appellate arguments.
The composite picture shows an evolving state common law on such
issues as: what constitutes a reasonable search; the effect of consent on
eliminating the need for probable cause; the required contents of a
search warrant; and the procedure for raising objections based on
Mapp.
I. MAPP'S SPECIFIC MANDATE

It is important to bear in mind the precise language of the fourth
amendment, which is the primary source for the law on search and
seizure.
The right of the people to be secure in their persons,
houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and
seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue,
but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation,
and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the
persons or things to be seized.6
Wolf v. Colorado" held that the fourth amendment is applicable to
the states through the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment,
but the Supreme Court there rejected the contention that the "concept of ordered liberty" required exclusion of illegally seized evidence
in state criminal proceedings. Mapp reversed Wolf, formulating a
narrow and specific holding "that all evidence obtained by searches and
seizures in violation of the Constitution is, by that same authority,
inadmissible in a state court." 8
Many state constitutions have a similar provision.
6 U.S. CoNsT. amend. IV.
See, e.g., PA. CONsT. art. I, § 8.
7 338 U.S. 25 (1949).
8 367 U.S. at 655.
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The opinion of the Court contains numerous indications that it
intended to require only the exclusion of evidence obtained as a result
of an unreasonable search and seizure, without imposing upon the
states the federal standard of reasonableness. The Court referred
favorably to the law in many states which already excluded such evidence, although not always on the same standards for exclusion
enunciated in the federal courts. The Supreme Court cited 9 California's adoption of the exclusionary rule in 1955, but California has
adopted a complicated standard of reasonableness which differs
markedly from federal criteria.Y Thus in lauding the states which
had adopted the exclusionary rule prior to Mapp v. Ohio, the Supreme
Court can be said to have implicitly recognized the right of the states
to decide for themselves what constitutes a reasonable search and
seizure.
The theory that the state courts have latitude in establishing their
own standards of reasonableness is buttressed by two principles reaffirmed in Mapp. First, "the very essence of healthy federalism depends on the avoidance of needless conflict between state and federal
courts." " That maxim suggests that the states may be able to satisfy
minimal due process standards without measuring up to federal rules
as to what is a reasonable search and seizure and what search warrants must contain. Second, in imposing the exclusionary rule on the
states, the Court waited until the states had had an "adequate opportunity to adopt or reject . . ." 12 it on their own.

Now that Mapp

has been decided, the same attitude of judicial restraint should constrain the Court to give the states a chance to acclimate themselves to
the exclusionary rule according to their own standards of reasonableness before federal criteria are imposed.
That the states have the right to decide what is "reasonable" in
the law of search and seizure is further supported by the doctrine that
the states retain all the rights possessed by them before the most recent United States Supreme Court decision, except that authority
which the ruling specifically abrogated. If an area of authority is
not explicitly taken away from the states by an expanded interpretation of the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment, then the
state retains it. This is the basic concept of the tenth amendment.
While the tenth amendment has shrunk in importance in direct pro9Id. at 651.
10 See People v. Ruiz, 196 Cal. App. Zd 798, 16 Cal. Rptr. 855, 858 (Dist. CL App.

1961).

11367 U.S. at 657-58.
1
2d. at 654.
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portion to the expansion of the fourteenth, it is still a basic underpinning of our federal system.
In addition, the step by step case approach which culminated in
the Mapp decision and the specific holding of Mapp itself indicate a
deliberate design on the part of the Supreme Court to do no more than
exclude illegally seized evidence in a state proceeding, leaving it up to
the state to determine the legality of the seizure within broad "due
process" limits.
The California courts have expressly decided that Mapp v. Ohio
leaves them free to use their own standards for what constitutes probable cause, stating:
We find nothing in Mapp v. Ohio

.

.

. to indi-

cate that as a result of that decision the states are bound to
of reasonable and probable
follow the federal requirements
13
cause instead of their own.
The Pennsylvania Superior Court, by inference, has reached the
same conclusion in Commonwealth v. Richards,14 which involved the
first substantive ruling on search and seizure by a Pennsylvania appellate court after Mapp. Responding to argument on the issue of
how far Mapp went in imposing federal law on the states, the Pennsylvania Superior Court declared:
As we view it, the Mapp decision went no further than
to hold that, where the search and seizure were unreasonable
under all the circumstances, evidence obtained thereunder
must, under the Fourteenth Amendment, be excluded in state
criminal prosecutions.1
The Superior Court declared that the test for reasonableness depended
on the "totality of facts" 16 since "the Mapp decision did not, as we
interpret it, preclude judicial determination of what constitutes a reasonable search and seizure under all the circumstances." 17
II. THE PENNSYLVANIA SUPERIOR COURT'S
RULINGS ON PROBABLE CAUSE

For the initial tests of post-Mapp search and seizure, the District
Attorney's Office of Philadelphia County chose the cases of Common13 People v. Tyler, 193 Cal. App. 2d 728, 734, 14 Cal. Rptr. 610, 613 (Dist. Ct.
App. 1961) ; accord, People v. Rucker, 17 Cal. Rptr. 98 (Dist. Ct. App. 1962).
14 198 Pa. Super. 39 (1962), petition for allocatur filed, Pa. Sup. Ct., June 21,

1962.
15 Id. at 42-43.
'6 Id. at 46.
17 Id. at 42.
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wealth v. Richards18 and Commwealth v. Bosurgi,'9 from which the
prosecution had a right of appeal. These cases were carefully selected
because both involved serious offenses of which the defendants were
obviously guilty. The factual situations were not extreme but had the
potential to establish important principles in the areas of greatest concern to law enforcement agencies.
A. Search of Premises
Commonwealth v. Richards presented an ideal case for appeal.
The defendant had been found guilty by the trial judge, sitting without a jury, on charges of possession of drugs, resisting arrest, and
assault and battery. The trial court, however, granted defendant's
motion in the arrest of judgment ruling that the key evidence, marijuana, had been obtained as a result of an unreasonable search and
seizure.
Acting on information received from a reliable informant that
the defendant had narcotics in his apartment, officers of the narcotics
squad had gone to the building where they were admitted to the first
floor by another tenant. Proceeding to the second floor, they had
encountered the defendant, who, after resisting, was arrested. Reacting to defendant's shouts of "They're here," the officers had kicked
open the door of his apartment in time to observe another man dive
head first through a window with a paper bag. Marijuana was later
found in both the bag and the apartment. Without that evidence, the
conviction could not stand.
The procedural setting made available to the Commonwealth the
well-established rule that the District Attorney can appeal from an
order arresting judgment after a guilty verdict.2" Moreover, the law
is firmly established that after a guilty verdict, the court on appeal accepts as true all of the Commonwealth's evidence upon which the trier
of fact could properly have based its verdict.
The Superior Court, in reversing, held that the seizure of evidence
was reasonable as there was probable cause, based on the reliable informant's report, to believe that the defendant had committed and was
continuing to commit a felony. The court equated probable cause with
reasonable grounds to believe that the person arrested and searched had
is198 Pa. Super. 39 (1962).
'9

198 Pa. Super. 47 (1962), allocatur granted, No. 381, Pa. Sup. Ct, July 17,

1962.
2o Commonwealth v. Wallace, 114 Pa. 405, 6 Ad. 685 (1886) ; Commonwealth v.
Obenreder, 144 Pa. Super. 253, 19 A.2d 497 (1941).
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committed a felony. Upon the authority of Draperv. United States, 21
it said:
Probable cause exists where "the facts and circumstances
within [the arresting officers'] knowledge and of which they
had reasonably trustworthy information [are] sufficient in
themselves to warrant a man of reasonable caution in the
belief that" an offense has been or is being committed.2 2
Accepting the reasoning of United States v. Rabinowitz,2" the Superior
Court also expressly rejected argument based on the contention that
the officers had had ample time to obtain a search warrant, stating that
the legality of a search depends upon reasonableness under all the circumstances and not solely upon the practicability of procuring a search
warrant.
B. Search of the Person
Commonwealth v. Bosurgi,24 argued and decided simultaneously

with Richards, was a case of extreme importance to the District Attorney's Office from both procedural and substantive viewpoints.25 On
the day after the burglary of a wholesale jewelry house, an informant
had told the investigating detective of a man in a taproom near the
scene of the crime who was attempting to sell watches. He had also
provided a detailed description. Not finding anyone fitting the description at the designated bar, the detective had entered another tavern
nearby where he noticed the defendant who matched the description.
The officer approached the defendant, asked his name, and then patted
him down to determine whether he was armed. Feeling bulky objects
in Bosurgi's pockets, the detective found watches, some of which came
from the jewelry store. Subsequent investigation at the police station
uncovered particles of the plate glass window from the burglarized
store on Bosurgi's trousers. Following the indictment of Bosurgi for
burglary, his counsel filed a pretrial motion to suppress evidence alleging that it was obtained by the police as a result of an unlawful search
and seizure. The Court of Quarter Sessions granted the motion after
a pretrial hearing on the limited question of the detective's probable
cause for searching Bosurgi.
Without the suppressed evidence, the Commonwealth would have
been compelled to nolle prosequi the case. Accordingly, a decision was
213538
22 198
23 339
24 198

U.S. 307 (1958).
Pa. Super. at 45.

U.S. 56 (1950).
Pa. Super. 47 (1962).
2
5 The procedural questions are discussed in the text accompanying notes 121,
123-27 infra.
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reached to take an appeal in order to determine the procedural right of
the Commonwealth to appeal from a pretrial order suppressing evidence
and to resolve important substantive questions concerning search of
the person.
On the merits, the Superior Court held that the search was reasonable since the police officer had probable cause to believe that the
defendant had committed a felony. The Assistant District Attorney
had argued alternatively that the detective had probable cause to think
Bosurgi had committed a felony and therefore the search was legal as
incidental to the arrest, and even if probable cause to believe that the
defendant had committed a felony was lacking, the search was legal
because the officer had probable cause to suspect the defendant of having committed a burglary. With the second alternative, the District
Attorney's Office sought to persuade the court to rule that a legal
search may be made without that degree of probable cause necessary to
justify an arrest if circumstances arouse reasonable suspicion that the
defendant has committed an offense. This should be sufficient to
justify an officer in searching the defendant. If the search discloses incriminating evidence, the defendant could be arrested. Under this
theory the essential test of the reasonableness of a search and seizure
would turn on whether there was sufficient cause to suspect the defendant of committing an offense rather than whether there was probable
cause to arrest the defendant.
The Superior Court by-passed the Commonwealth's "suspicion"
theory by holding that the police officer had reasonable grounds to
believe that the defendant had committed a felony. The court based
that conclusion on the fact that the officer knew a burglary had been
committed in the immediate vicinity; that he had received information
describing the defendant in detail; and that the defendant was selling
watches in the vicinity of the burglary. Under that "totality of facts,"
the court ruled that the officer had probable cause and reasonable
grounds to believe that the defendant had committed the crime and,
therefore, to arrest him. The officer's patting down the defendant in
order to determine whether he was armed may have been an important
factor in Bosurgi. There is some suggestion that a seizure may be
justified where objects are found by an officer in patting down a defendant to see if he is armed.
On only one occasion have the seven Superior Court judges agreed
on the factual application of the doctrine of probable cause. In Commonwealth v. Johnson,2 6 a unanimous court affirmed per curiam the
2627 Pa. D. & C2d 301 (Philadelphia County Q. Sess. 1961), aff'd per curilm, 198 Pa. Super. 51 (1962), petition for allocatur filed, Pa. Sup. Ct., June 21,
1962.
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decision of the Court of Quarter Sessions of Philadelphia County, in
which the search of a narcotics addict was upheld. In that case, the
police officer testified that he had observed the defendant alight from a
bus arriving from New York City at the Philadelphia Terminal, and
look around as if stunned or in the dazed condition characteristic of
narcotic addicts. Based on his experience of over four years of observing drug addicts, the officer had concluded that the defendant was
under the influence of narcotics. A search undertaken after Johnson
had been taken into custody disclosed a cellophane packet of heroin
concealed in his hat band. The trial court, and later the Superior
Court, held that the search, without a warrant, was proper as incidental to the arrest which in turn was justifiable under the Pennsylvania rule that a police officer may arrest upon the reasonable belief
that a felony has been committed. A crucial factor in the lower court's
evaluation was that the police officer had probable cause to believe that
a felony was being committed based on the officer's extensive experience with narcotic addicts. It ruled that what constitutes probable
cause must be determined from the standpoint of the officer considering
his unique skill and knowledge, rather than from the standpoint of the
average citizen. Another important factor was that the officer, in
proceeding to the Philadelphia Bus Terminal, had acted "on information received." 27
C. Search of Automobiles
After defining probable cause with respect to search of a dwelling
in Richards and considering reasonableness as it affected the search
of an individual in Bosurgi, the Superior Court defined probable cause
as that concept relates to an automobile in Commonwealth v. One 1955
Buick Sedan." That case arose in a slightly different setting-a forfeiture proceeding for use of an automobile to transport whiskey
unlawfully.
As the result of information that there was an odor of alcohol in
the area, two police officers observed a house for several days. On the
fourth day, a Buick sedan, operated by a known violator of the liquor
laws, drove up to the premises. After remaining in the house for
about an hour, the driver made several trips between the house and
car; on the last, he carried a carton which he placed on the back seat
and drove away. The officers followed and then stopped the automobile. On the back seat they found four one-gallon jugs of white
untaxed whiskey. The operator was arrested, his car subjected to a
2727 Pa. D. & C.2d at 305.
28198 Pa. Super. 133 (1962).
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search, and the automobile seized, all without a warrant. Afterward
the officers obtained a search warrant for the premises which had been
under surveillance, where they found a still. The operator's petition
for the return of his car was denied by the Court of Quarter Sessions
of Philadelphia County, and that order was affirmed by the Superior
Court.
In holding that the search and seizure were reasonable, the Superior Court adopted the distinction made by the Supreme Court of
the United States in Carroll v. United States,' that different considerations apply to a search of a vehicle than of a residence. The court
reasoned that it was not practicable to secure a search warrant for a
vehicle because it could be quickly moved out of the locality or jurisdiction, and therefore upheld the legality of the search and seizure,
stating:
It would have been unreasonable to expect the officers to
go some distance away and obtain a warrant for search and
seizure when the moving automobile, within a few minutes,
probably would have been out of reach of the officers"
The reasonableness of the search of a stationary automobile, without any opportunity to move, was considered in Commonwealth v.
Czajkowski.1 Despite certain procedural problems, 2 the Superior
Court considered the case on the merits and upheld the legality of the
search and seizure. The undisputed evidence at trial established that
the defendant's automobile was observed in the vicinity of a department
store at the time a burglary was being committed. The automobile was
parked in a peculiar position approximately one hundred yards from
the store. At one point the officer noticed the car lights being flashed
on and off, saw two men in the automobile as it moved parallel to the
department store's parking lot, and then three men in the automobile.
From the license number, the officer determined that the automobile
belonged to the defendant, who was apprehended on the following day.
An examination of his automobile by the police disclosed pieces of
firewall and an innerplate from the safe which had been opened during
the burglary.
On these facts, the Superior Court held that the police clearly had
probable cause and reasonable grounds to search the automobile incident to the arrest of the defendant. Rejecting the contention that
the officers had an opportunity to obtain a search warrant, the court
29 267 U.S. 132 (1925).
3o 198 Pa. Super. at 140.
31 198 Pa. Super. 511 (1962).
32 See note 112 infra and accompanying text.
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said that the legality of the search turned on its reasonableness and
propriety under all the circumstances rather than on the practicability
of obtaining a search warrant, emphasizing that "an automobile as a
vehicle of transport which moves about readily is in a distinct category
on the question of a reasonable search and seizure." " The two dissenting judges expressed the view that there had been ample time to
secure a search warrant since there was no chance that the defendant
would remove the car before a search warrant could be obtained. 4
III.

PROBABLE CAUSE CONSIDERED BY PENNSYLVANIA TRIAL COURTS

The Pennsylvania trial courts have also defined probable cause in
a variety of factual situations. Like the federal courts and state appellate courts, they are as badly divided on what facts constitute probable
cause as they are in complete agreement on the generalized principles
of that concept. An analysis of numerous decisions by the judges of
the courts of quarter sessions and oyer and terminer in Pennsylvania
generally, and Philadelphia County specifically, discloses that the judges
are consistent in their own rulings and at odds with their fellow judges
in applying the principles in practice.
A. In General
An extensive analysis of federal law and Pennsylvania law, before
Mapp, is contained in Commonwealth v. Silverberg. 5 In that case, a
reliable informant had tipped off the police that the defendant would
make a marijuana sale on a certain corner in Philadelphia at a designated time. Believing that a drug transaction was about to take place,
an officer apprehended the defendant and conducted a search which disclosed not marijuana, but a blackjack. The defendant was indicted for
carrying a concealed deadly weapon, and a motion to suppress the
evidence followed.
The court denied the motion, ruling that reasonable cause deals
with probabilities judged in terms of practical considerations of everyday life on which reasonable and prudent men act. Recognizing that
probable cause could not be determined by any fixed formula, the court
cited Brinegar v. United States " for the proposition that probable
cause exists where the facts and circumstances within the arresting officer's knowledge and of which he has reasonably praiseworthy information are sufficient to justify a man of reasonable caution to believe that
33

198 Pa. Super. at 516.

_41d. at
35

517 (dissenting opinion by Watkins, J., joined in by Flood, J.).
No. 1586, April 1962 Sess., Philadelphia County, Pa., Q. Sess., June 18, 1962.

36 338

U.S. 160 (1949).
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an offense has been or is being committed. Similarly, under Pennsylvania law, probable cause is recognized where there are reasonable
grounds for suspicion, supported by circumstances sufficient to warrant an ordinarily prudent man in the same situation in believing the
accused party is guilty of the offense charged. 37
The next question considered in Silverberg was whether hearsay
information provided a sufficient basis for the officer's conclusion that
probable cause existed. On this issue, the court relied on Commonwealth v. Schwartz.38 There, the Superior Court concluded that a
police officer, seeking a search warrant, need not have personal knowledge of the alleged violations of law so long as he is satisfied that his
information was provided by credible persons who had dealings with
the defendant at the place specified in the warrant. The Silverberg
court further observed that federal authorities were in accord since the
United States Supreme Court had specifically upheld the issuance of a
search warrant even though the police officer based his conclusion that
the requisite cause existed on hearsay information supplied to him by
an informant. 9 To the federal and state authorities cited, the court
added an additional requirement of its own which it said was dictated
by research although no specific authority was cited: "[T]he record
must show that the police officer relied upon the informer to the extent
that he reasonably believed the law had been violated." " The final conclusion was that it was immaterial that an object other than the one
which the officer sought was found, nor was it crucial that the officer
failed to obtain a warrant even though he had time to do so.
On the day following its decision in Silverberg, the same court
suppressed evidence in another case, holding that it was obtained as a
result of an unreasonable search and seizure.4 ' Two police officers had
searched the defendant's person and the automobile in which he was
sitting, finding numbers paraphernalia which led to his arrest and indictment for setting up and maintaining an illegal lottery. The officers
testified that they had kept certain premises under surveillance. They
had observed the defendant make numerous stops and then proceed to
the premises under surveillance from which he later emerged. The
court began with the proposition that a search without a warrant is
37 See Commonwealth v. Loesel, 155 Pa. Super. 461, 38 A.2d 523 (1944) ; Reby
v. Whalen, 119 Pa. Super. 476, 179 AtI. 879 (1935).
38 82 Pa. Super. 369 (1923).
39 Jones v. United States, 362 U.S. 257, 267-72 (1960).
40
No. 1586, April 1962 Sess., Philadelphia County, Pa., Q. Sess., June 18,
1962, p. 5.
41 Commonwealth v. Brockington, No. 902, Oct. 1961 Sess., Philadelphia County,
Pa., Q. Sess., June 19, 1962.

16

UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW

[Vol.ll1:4

invalid unless incidental to a lawful arrest. Reasoning that the lottery
offense is only a misdemeanor in Pennsylvania so that the police officer
must actually see the crime committed in his presence to make a valid
arrest, the court held that the search and seizure was illegal.
The case of Commonwealth v. Griffith,42 in Erie County, produced
a well reasoned opinion on the question of probable cause for search
and seizure. Griffith was struck on the back of the head and knocked
unconscious by an unknown assailant. The policeman who arrived at
the scene found that Griffith had been drinking, was covered with blood
from a scalp wound, and was unable to identify even the municipality
in which he was found. One of the officers, who was placing Griffith
in a police vehicle to be taken to the local hospital for treatment, felt a
gun inside his pocket. Griffith was then searched, and a loaded pistol
was discovered, leading to the charge of violation of the Uniform Firearms Act.
The court held the search and seizure legal on the ground that the
officer had a duty to search the defendant and seize the gun when, in
the exercise of his sensory faculties, the officer discovered that the law
was being violated in his presence. That conclusion was required, said
the court, by the practical necessities of removing the gun expeditiously
to prevent possible dire consequences if the defendant had an inclination
to use it to obtain his release.
The opinion also suggested an interesting alternative ground for
justifying the search and seizure arising out of the defendant's incapacitation. The defendant might have been in need of some special medical
attention, such as treatment for an allergy, diabetes, laryngeal difficulties, or in need of blood transfusion, any one of which might have been
disclosed by a card in his possession. This factor of modem life, reasoned the court, has "created an absolute necessity for personal searches
by those who come to the aid of stricken unfortunates." "
In concluding that the search was not violative of the federal constitution, the court made some important observations on the need to
obtain a search warrant under such circumstances. It rejected the suggestion that one of the officers should have gone to obtain a warrant
while the second officer stayed with the defendant, because there was
no question but that the concealed article was a gun which was known
to the officer at the time of its detection. The court further stated that
search warrants are authorized only for places and not for persons.
Moreover the search of defendant's person was legal because supported
by ample probable cause. If the officer had the requisite probable cause
42No. 294, May 1962 Sess., Erie County, Pa., Q. Sess., June 21, 1962.
431d. at 5-6.
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to obtain a search warrant, then he had the necessary cause to make a
search without a warrant. The essential question is whether there was
probable cause either for obtaining a warrant or for a search without
a warrant. Thus, if probable cause existed, there was no real reason to
delay the search to obtain a warrant. If this reasoning is sound then
there would be no need to obtain a search warrant in any situation
since the probable cause which would support a search with a warrant
would support one without a warrant as well. This reasoning, however, may be limited to searches of individuals.
The issue of what constitutes probable cause was considered at
length by the Court of Common Pleas of Mercer County, Pennsylvania,
in Commonwealth ex rel. La Camera v. McDougall." Relying on
Commonwealth v. Schwartz,45 which held that probable cause may be
equated with reasonable grounds for belief that an offense has been
committed, the court concluded that the standard was satisfied where
the police officer had been informed in numerous telephone calls that
the defendant was in the gambling business, where the defendant's
house was placed under surveillance for several days, and where the
officer knew that the defendant made his living from gambling activities.
The doctrine of probable cause has been applied in approximately
two hundred and fifty decisions involving searches and seizures in
Philadelphia County in the first year following Mapp. These cases,
like thousands of others from other courts, produce no litmus tests;
but an outline of some of the decisions illustrates the problems and the
judicial temperaments in this formerly non-exclusionary state.48
Philadelphia trial courts, in dealing with the search of premises,
have accepted invitation or consent as justification for a search without
a warrant. 47 Consent obtained by deception, however, has been held to
invalidate the search.48 Officers who have a warrant cannot search
49
premises which are not described in the warrant.
In dealing with searches of the person, these courts have taken into
consideration the time of day at which the search took place. While
suspicious conduct late at night may justify a search without a war44 No. 108, Dec. 1961 Sess., Mercer County, Pa., C.P., Nov. 7, 1961.
45 82 Pa. Super. 369 (1923).

46 These summaries are based on notes of testimony (where
reports.
47 See Commonwealth v. Lloyd, Nos. 21-22, July 1961 Sess.,
Pa., Q. Sess., March 16, 1962.
48
Commonvealth v. Wright, Nos. 862-65, Nov. 1961 Sess.,
Pa., Ct Oyer & Terminer, June 8, 1962, appeal docketed, No.
Pa. Sup. Ct., July 17, 1962.
49 Commonwealth v. Padulese, Nos. 252-54, June 1961 Sess.,
Pa., Q. Sess., January 8, 1962.

available) and police
Philadelphia County,
Philadelphia County,
380, Jan. 1962 Sess.,
Philadelphia County,
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rant,50 suspicious conduct at other times, 5 or a past criminal record
may not.52
The Philadelphia courts have been fairly consistent in upholding
searches of automobiles without warrants.53 The fact that two men
were sitting in the front seat of an auto, acting suspiciously, however,
54
was held to be insufficient grounds for a search.
B. The "Routine" Car Stop and Motor Vehicle Code Violations
There has been general agreement among the judges of the Philadelphia Court of Quarter Sessions in cases of what is known as the
"routine" car stop. Most of these have resulted in the suppression of
the evidence on the theory that if the officer had no probable cause for
the search prior to the time incriminating evidence was seized, the
search may not be pulled up by its own boot straps based on the incriminating evidence which it uncovers.55
A more complicated question arises when officers, stopping a motorist for a violation of the Motor Vehicle Code, search his car and
seize incriminating evidence totally unconnected with the violation for
which he was initially stopped. The Philadelphia Court of Quarter
Sessions has generally disfavored such a procedure,5" although it did
validate such a5 7search where the evidence indicated that the operator
had consented.
In a lecture at the District Attorneys' Convention at Wernersville,
Pennsylvania, on July 11, 1962, Judge Burton R. Laub suggested the
theory that the search of an automobile should be justifiable without
50 Commonwealth v. Borek, Nos. 1052-53, July 1961 Sess., Philadelphia County,

Pa., Q. Sess., March 16, 1962; Commonwealth v. Copeland, No. 22, Jan. 1961 Sess.,
Philadelphia County, Pa., Q. Sess., April 13, 1962.
51 Commonwealth v. Esposito, No. 228, Feb. 1962 Sess., Philadelphia County,
Pa., Q. Sess., June 19, 1962; Commonwealth v. Lindsay, No. 1212, May 1961 Sess.,

Philadelphia County, Pa., Q. Sess., March 16, 1962.
52 Commonwealth v. Alston, No. 419, April 1961 Sess., Philadelphia County, Pa.,

Q. Sess., Feb. 2, 1962.
53 See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Major, Nos. 1297-98, Sept. 1961 Sess., Philadelphia

County, Pa., Q. Sess., Feb. 9, 1962; Commonwealth v. McGonigle, No. 1589, May

1961 Sess., Philadelphia County, Pa., Q. Sess., Nov. 25, 1961; Commonwealth v.
Bryant, No. 857, Dec. 1961 Sess., Philadelphia County, Pa., Q. Sess., April 19, 1962;
Commonwealth v. Craig, No. 697, Jan. 1962 Sess., Philadelphia County, Pa., Q. Sess.,
June 30, 1962.
5 Commonwealth v. Temple, No. 916, Feb. 1962 Sess., Philadelphia County, Pa.,

Q. Sess., June 8, 1962.
55See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Peoples, No. 1879, Oct. 1961 Sess., Philadelphia

County, Pa., Q. Sess., March 2, 1962; Commonwealth v. D'Amore, Nos. 821-22,
June 1961 Sess., Philadelphia County, Pa., Q. Sess., March 30, 1962; Commonwealth

v. Irvin, No. 1997, May 1961 Sess., Philadelphia County, Pa., Q. Sess., Feb. 16, 1962.
56 Commonwealth v. Isley, No. 1120, Oct. 1961 Sess., Philadelphia County, Pa.,

Q. Sess., March 27, 1962; Commonwealth v. Roney, No. 742, Dec. 1961 Sess., Philadelphia County, Pa., Q. Sess., Dec. 22, 1961.
57 Commonwealth v. Mason, No. 845, March 1962 Sess., Philadelphia County,

Pa., Q. Sess., June 30, 1962.
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a showing of any special cause by virtue of the motorist's using state
highways. It was his view that while the federal government cannot
imply consent to search a motorist's car from his use of a state highway,
the state can, since the highway is the state's and the use of it is a privilege rather than a right. This, Judge Laub reasoned, would be very
similar to the right of the federal government to search an individual
entering the United States from a foreign country without any reason
for suspecting irregularity.
Judge Laub further suggested that if the courts could not construe
the implied consent on their own authority, this might be a proper
subject for legislation framed as an amendment to the Motor Vehicle
Code. Under such a statute the motorist would be deemed to grant
state law enforcement officials the right to search his car without any
special reason, in return for the privilege of operating the motor vehicle
within the Commonwealth. This implied authorization would be similar to that of the Non-Resident Motor Vehicle Statute under which a
non-resident of Pennsylvania who drives within the state is deemed
to have authorized the Secretary of the Commonwealth to accept service of legal process against him for any suit instituted as a result of an
automobile collision while the motorist was within Pennsylvania.
While this is an interesting and unique theory, it is very doubtful
that such a doctrine would withstand the scrutiny of the United States
Supreme Court in view of the evolving attitude evidenced by Mapp v.
Ohio. It is probable that the Court would view an individual's use of
the highway as a right, rather than a privilege, so that waiver of the
constitutional protection against unreasonable search could not be implied. The reaction of the Philadelphia Quarter Sessions' judges in
striking down seizures based on "routine" car stops and searches following violations of the Motor Vehicle Code suggests that the Philadelphia judiciary would also not be inclined to construe liberally an
officer's right to stop a car and search the motorist under Judge Laub's
novel theory.
C. "Routine" Person Stops
Most of the decided cases have resulted in the suppression of evidence obtained as a result of the search of an individual following a
"routine" person stop. This is so even though the hour of the search
was late or the defendant had a previous record."'
Some judges of the Philadelphia Court of Quarter Sessions, however, have upheld searches of persons when there were some, although
58

Commonwealth v. Kessler, Nos. 1415-17, Oct. 1961 Sess., Philadelphia County,
Pa., Q. Sess., March 23, 1962; Commonwealth v. Stewart, No. 768, Aug. 1961 Sess.,
Philadelphia County, Pa., Q. Sess., March 9, 1962.
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not very many, additional circumstances. In Commonwealth v. Richardson,59 the police, after receiving information from an informant,
stopped the defendant walking along the highway and found a revolver
on his person. A motion to suppress the evidence was denied. A similar ruling was handed down in the case of Commonwealth v. Morton."0
Officers had observed a pedestrian at an intersection at approximately
10:30 p.m. walking towards them. When the officers were within view
of the defendant, he turned and walked the other way. The officer
stopped the defendant, searched him, and seized a .22 caliber revolver.
In justifying their actions, the officers testified that their suspicions
were aroused because there had been a number of strong-arm robberies
in the area. The Richardson and Morton cases may be distinguished
from the other "routine" person stops on the ground that the hour of
the night, combined with the location, created probable cause for the
search and seizure without any additional factors. The court could take
judicial notice of the frequency of robberies and muggings in the areas
of Philadelphia involved. This may have been the rationale of these
rulings, although no reasons were given.
One type of person stop in certain slum areas of Philadelphia consistently results in suppression of evidence. The indigent residents are
often found with untaxed liquor. It has therefore become a common
police practice to stop anyone seen in these areas with a bag which
might contain such contraband. These cases consistently result in
suppression of the evidence. A classical illustration is Commonwealth
v. Halsell6 where the hearing on the motion to suppress took a matter
of seconds and is contained on two-thirds of a single page of notes of
testimony.
IV. SCOPE OF SEARCH INCIDENTAL TO ARREST

The scope of search incidental to an arrest was the subject of an
illuminating opinion in Commonwealth v. Donahue," which involved
poolselling, bookmaking, conspiracy, and keeping and maintaining a
gaming house. A woman arrested in a hotel office stated that she
placed bets by phoning the defendant, who occupied a room in the
hotel. The officers then proceeded to the room where they found
Donahue with a slip of paper containing a list of telephone numbers.
59

No. 1068, March 1962 Sess., Philadelphia County, Pa., Q. Sess., April 13,

1962.
60 Nos. 1990-91, May 1961 Sess., Philadelphia County, Pa., Q. Sess., June 30,
1962.
61 No. 845, Jan. 1962 Sess., Philadelphia County, Pa., Q. Sess., March 30, 1962.
62Nos. 1390-92, April 1961 Sess., Philadelphia County, Pa., Q. Sess., Dec. 28,
1961.
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The telephone rang and an officer took telephone numbers from the
caller. It was then ascertained that the hotel room was being used as
a relay office where horse bettors called to give only the number from
which they were calling. The telephone numbers were then relayed to
the bank which telephoned the players to secure the bets.
At the trial the defendant's motion to suppress the paper containing the telephone numbers was denied. Starting with the proposition
that no warrant is required for a search incidental to valid arrest, the
court ruled that Pennsylvania law permitted an officer to arrest for
any misdemeanor committed in his presence.3 On the basis of federal
precedents, the court concluded that there was a permissible area of
search beyond the person proper. The court stated that an officer, incidental to a valid arrest, could properly search premises under the
control of the person being arrested, and all parts of the premises used
for unlawful purposes. It further held that the facts of the case were
distinguishable from Go-Bart Importing Co. v. United States,' and
United States v. Lefkowitz, 5 which condemned general exploratory
searches with or without a warrant.
V. EFFECT OF TIME TO GET WARRANT

In evaluating the reasonableness of a search and seizure without
a warrant, courts have attached some significance to the time the officer
had to secure a warrant. Pennsylvania judges, however, are divided
as to whether failure to obtain a warrant when there was time to do so
vitiates an otherwise valid seizure. Considering the vacillation of the
Supreme Court of the United States on this point, it is not surprising
that Pennsylvania courts have not been in agreement. In Trupiano
v. United States," the Supreme Court held that a valid arrest did not
in itself justify a search without a warrant; the prosecution had to
show that under the circumstances it was unreasonable or impracticable
to require the arresting officer to obtain a warrant. Two years later,
however, in United States v. Rabinowitz,67 the Court ruled that the
officers were not bound to obtain a search warrant even if there was
time, if the seizure was otherwise reasonable. To allay any doubt of
the effect of that holding on Trupiano, the Court expressly stated:
To the extent that Trupiano v. United States, 334 U.S.
699, requires a search warrant solely upon the basis of the
practicability of procuring it rather than upon the reasonable63 See Commonwealth v. Rubin, 82 Pa. Super. 315 (1923).
64282 U.S. 344 (1931).
65 285 U.S. 452 (1932).
00334 U.S. 699 (1948).
67 339

U.S. 56 (1950).
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ness of the search after a lawful arrest, that case is overruled.'
Such an express ruling on a controversial question should have
resolved the issue, but in 1961 the Supreme Court may have revived
the Trupiano dictum in Chapman v. United States,69 in which it stated:
Here, as in that case, "no reason is offered for not obtaining a search warrant except the inconvenience to the
officers and some slight delay necessary to prepare papers and
present the evidence to a magistrate. These are never very
convincing reasons and, in these circumstances, certainly not
enough to bypass the constitutional requirement. No suspect
was fleeing or likely to take flight. The search was of permanent premises, not of a movable vehicle. No evidence or
contraband was threatened with removal or destruction, except perhaps the fumes which we suppose in time would
disappear. 0
Nevertheless, in two instances, Pennsylvania trial courts have rejected defense arguments based on Trupiano, on the ground that that
case was overruled by Rabinowitz. 1 And in other cases, the Court
of Quarter Sessions of Philadelphia County has upheld the validity of
searches and seizures notwithstanding the absence of warrants which
the police could have obtained. In Commonwealth v. Randolph," an
informant who had provided reliable information on approximately
twenty previous occasions advised the police that the defendant possessed narcotics at his nearby apartment. Without obtaining a warrant, the police immediately went to the defendant's apartment and
there seized narcotics paraphernalia. The trial judge denied defendant's motion to suppress the evidence. The same result was reached in
Commonwealth v. Kutos,73 in which police without a warrant had
seized stolen goods from defendant's apartment while he was in
custody.
In other decisions of the Pennsylvania trial courts, opportunity to
obtain a warrant has apparently been fatal to the admission of evidence
seized without one. The Court of Quarter Sessions suppressed important evidence in Commonwealth v. Wright "4 where the police had
6s Id. at 66.
69365 U.S. 610 (1961).
70 Id. at 615.
71 Commonwealth v. Silverberg, No. 1586, April 1962 Sess., Philadelphia County,
Pa., Q. Sess., June 18, 1962; Commonwealth v. Donahue, Nos. 1390-92, April 1961
Sess., Philadelphia County, Pa., Q. Sess., Dec. 28, 1961.
72 No. 480, April 1962 Sess., Philadelphia County, Pa., Q. Sess., June 29, 1962.
78 No. 1319, Dec. 1961 Sess., Philadelphia County, Pa., Q. Sess., April 18, 1962.
74 Nos. 862-65, Nov. 1961 Sess., Philadelphia County, Pa., Ct. Oyer & Terminer,
June 8, 1962, appeal docketed, No. 380, Jan. 1962 Sess., Pa. Sup. Ct., July 17, 1962.
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returned to the defendant's house without a warrant four hours after
he was arrested and then obtained crucial evidence in a felony-murder
case. In the colloquy at the hearing on defendant's motion to suppress,
the court indicated that its suppression of the evidence was motivated,
in part, by the fact that the detectives had an opportunity to get a
search warrant before returning. Similar evidence was suppressed in
Commonwealth v. Cohen.75 A druggist reported to the police that he
believed the defendant was trying to have a forged prescription for
narcotics filled. The doctor, who allegedly had signed the prescription,
confirmed the druggist's suspicions. The defendant was detained at
the police station while an officer searched his residence, finding marijuana and other narcotics paraphernalia. The defendant's motion to
suppress the evidence was granted, presumably on the ground that the
officer had ample time to obtain a warrant, although there was no
written opinion in this case. In other instances, evidence of possession
of numbers paraphernalia,'7 operation of a still,17 and possession of
narcotics 7s was suppressed where no warrant to search the premises
had been obtained although the police had had time to do so.
The Pennsylvania Superior Court has already considered this
79
question three times. In Commonwealth v. Richards, it rejected the
contention that the officers had ample time to obtain a search warrant,
ruling that the validity of a search turns upon the reasonableness
under all the circumstances, rather than on the practicability of
procuring a search warrant. The same answer to the same argument
°
was expressed in Commonwealth v. Czajkowski, and Commonwealth
1 The majority's opinion that it would have
v. One 1955 Buick Sedan."
been unreasonable to expect the officers to obtain a search warrant in
One 1955 Buick Sedan led Judge Watkins, in dissent, to characterize
the majority's view as "tortured interpretation of the facts."
VI. THE SEARCH WARRANT
The requisite contents of a legal search warrant has been a recurrent and torturous problem since Mapp. Search warrants have long
7 Nos. 1515-18, Nov. 1961 Sess., Philadelphia County, Pa., Q. Sess., March 16,
1962.
76 Commonwealth v. Samuels, Nos. 158-60, May 1961 Sess., Philadelphia County,

Pa., Q. Sess., Jan. 18, 1962.

77 Commonwealth v. Wiggins, No. 178, Oct. 1961 Sess., Philadelphia County, Pa.,
Q. Sess., March 16, 1962.
78 Commonvealth v. Witherspoon, No. 2239, May 1961 Sess., Philadelphia County,
Pa., Q. Sess., Feb. 11, 1962.
79

198 Pa. Super. 39 (1962).

80 198 Pa. Super. 511 (1962).
81 198 Pa. Super. 133 (1962).
82

Id. at 141 (Watldns, J., dissenting).
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been used under Pennsylvania practice, but the formalities of their execution and substance were not scrutinized prior to the time Pennsylvania became an exclusionary state under the mandate of Mapp.
A. Magistrates' Practices
Prior to 1961 it was commonplace to see police officers obtain
search warrants from magistrates at divisional police courts before
hearings, without being sworn and with very little, if any, information
being given to establish probable cause. The informality of police and
magistrates' practices was severely criticized in a recent opinion denouncing the issuance of search warrants where the officer was not
sworn. 3 At trial, counsel for defendant Simmons had questioned the
police officer concerning the search warrant used to seize numbers paraphernalia essential to the prosecution. On cross-examination the officer
admitted that he was not under oath when he requested the search warrant and he could not recall anything he said to the magistrate. The
court accordingly ruled that the warrant was invalidly obtained, suppressed the evidence, and discharged the defendant.
The Simmons opinion evoked a sharp reaction among the magistrates; for a time, one magistrate refused to issue warrants under any
circumstances. The Philadelphia District Attorney's Office advised the
Commissioner of Police about the requirements set forth in Simmons,
with which the District Attorney's Office concurred, and since that time
there has been no further difficulty on this point.
Early in 1962, however, a serious problem erupted when the magistrates refused to issue search warrants to the police without disclosure
of the identity of confidential informants. On the basis of the opinions
in Simmons and Commonwealth v. Patrone,8 ' the Solicitor for the
Board of Magistrates took the position that the magistrates could issue
warrants only when competent evidence was presented to them. The
Police Commissioner categorically refused to expose his informants on
the ground that disclosure would terminate their usefulness. The magistrates countered that the police had to trust them if they were to honor
the veracity of the police and issue search warrants. After two warrantless weeks, a meeting of the Police Commissioner and his deputy, the
Chief Magistrate and his counsel, the District Attorney and two Assistants, and the City Solicitor and his Assistant finaly resolved the
problem. An eight-point agreement was formulated which essentially
provided that the warrant should contain specific facts concerning the
83 Commonvealth v. Simmons, 26 Pa. D. & C.2d 120 (Philadelphia County
Q. Sess. 1961).
8427 Pa. D. & C.2d 343 (Philadelphia County Q. Sess. 1962).
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nature of the investigation and surveillance, the information which was
received from any informant, if available, and certification that the officer requesting the warrant was sworn. The magistrates finally retreated from their insistence that the identity of confidential informants
5
be disclosed, when confronted with the case of United States v. Jones,"
which held that even under federal law, a commissioner was justified
in issuing a search and seizure warrant without the disclosure of the
identity of a confidential informant.
B. Substance of the Warrant
The substance of the search warrant has proved to be a very
troublesome problem for law enforcement officials. Prior to Mapp, the
closest appellate court decision on what a valid search warrant must
contain under Pennsylvania law was Commonwealth v. Schwartz. 6
The Superior Court there ruled that in the absence of a statute expressly requiring details, it was sufficient for the affidavit to say "that
there is probable cause to believe, and that he [the affiant] has just and
reasonable grounds for believing and does believe . . . . " The court
said, "The affiant is not restricted to violations of law within his own
knowledge nor is he bound to set forth the names of witnesses or the
details as to what they would testify." 87 The court squarely disagreed
with the federal decisions in this field, deciding that Pennsylvania requirements were less stringent than those under federal law; hence the
decisions of federal courts as to the essentials of search warrants were
of little use in deciding the applicable Pennsylvania rule.
After Mapp, however, two Pennsylvania trial courts held insufficient warrants which closely resembled the one considered in
Schwartz.8 In the section entitled "Probable Cause and/or Reasonable
Grounds," one warrant read, "From surveillance and information I
have real cause to believe and do believe that this property is being
used illegally." 89 Both courts ruled that a search warrant was legally
insufficient if it did not contain an adequate statement of supporting
facts, and cited federal authority.
The Commonwealth has taken an appeal in the second of these two
cases,90 which has not yet been decided. It has made three contentions:
85 362 U.S. 257, 267-72 (1960).

86 82 Pa. Super. 369 (1923).
87 Id. at 374-75.
88 Commonwealth v. Patrone, 27 Pa. D. & C.2d 343 (Philadelphia County Q.
Sess. (1962); Commonwealth v. Griffin, Nos. 2459-61, Jan. 1962 Sess., Philadelphia
County, Pa., Q. Sess., June 21, 1962, appeal docketed, No. 321, Oct. 1962 Sess., Pa.
Super. Ct., June 22, 1962.
89 Commonwealth v. Patrone, supra note 88 at 344.
90 Commonwealth v. Griffin, Nos. 2459-61, Jan. 1962 Sess., Philadelphia County,
Pa., Q. Sess., June 21, 1962, appeal docketed, No. 321, Oct. 1962 Sess., Pa. Super. Ct.,
June 22, 1962.
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(1) Probable cause in fact existed for the search, and it is not determinative that the details establishing probable cause were not set forth
on the fact of the warrant; (2) there is a presumption that a warrant
was properly issued, the burden of proof being on the party who seeks
to suppress the evidence to establish that probable cause did not exist
for its issuance; and (3) the warrant complied with the technical requirements of Pennsylvania law, which differs from federal law.
The question of what facts the search warrant must contain was
also the subject of an extensive post-Mapp opinion in Commonwealth
ex rel. LaCamera v. McDougall.9 That case involved a search and
seizure after the officer executed an affidavit stating "number slips
[are] being delivered or picked up at 917 Fruit Avenue in the City of
Farrell" and that "there is just cause to suspect that number slips or
some part thereof are concealed in the residence of Mr. and Mrs.
LaCamera at that address." These statements are more detailed than
those set forth in the two cases discussed, but they do not present the
factual details of the officer's observation, surveillance, or investigation
as required under those decisions. Recognizing that "the evidence of
the alleged fact is not set forth in detail," the court held that "that is
not required" based upon the Pennsylvania Superior Court's decision
in Commonwealth v. Schwartz,9" considered above.
C. GeographicalScope of the Warrant
The geographical range of a warrant authorizing a search and
seizure was the subject of a cogent opinion in Commonwealth v. Tracton.9 3 As a result of investigation of an extensive burglary ring, the

police decided to search several premises simultaneously in order to
preclude flight and removal of the stolen goods. A search warrant was
obtained from a judge of the Court of Quarter Sessions of Philadelphia County for the search of the defendant's home in Philadelphia.
When the police arrived at that address, they found that the defendant
had moved to Montgomery County. The detective then appeared
before a magistrate in Philadelphia who questioned him regarding probable cause. The detective exhibited the warrant obtained from the
Quarter Sessions judge and, without being sworn, informed the magistrate generally as to the facts presented to obtain that warrant. The
magistrate then issued a search warrant for defendant's premises in
Montgomery County.
Responding to defendant's motion to suppress the evidence found
in the search, the court noted that the Act of 1722, which granted
91 No. 108, Dec. 1961 Sess., Mercer County,
92 82 Pa. Super. 369 (1923).
9

3 Misc. Docket, Philadelphia County, Pa.,

Pa., C.P., Nov. 7, 1961.

Q. Sess., June 25, 1962.
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validity to magistrates' subpoenas in any county of the Commonwealth,
includes the language "and other warrants." " Based on this statutory
language and the rationale that search warrants, being of less immediate import than a body warrant, should be no more limited, the court
ruled that the warrant was valid. The defendant's argument that the
detective's failure to swear to the second warrant was a fatal defect
was rejected, on the ground that the matter must be viewed as a continuing one, and the second warrant had no standing without reference
to the first which was sworn. It is the facts, reasoned the court, which
make the warrant valid rather than the act of swearing. The magistrate
had a right to rely on the previous warrant issued by a superior tribunal, and therefore, on the "totality of facts," the warrant was valid
and the search was legal.
VII.

CONSENT ELIMINATES THE NEED FOR A WARRANT OR
PROBABLE CAUSE

There is a developing doctrine in Pennsylvania that evidence
seized without a warrant or probable cause is admissible if obtained
with the consent of the defendant or the individual in possession of
the seized article. In Commonwealth v. Bosurgi,5 the defendant willingly responded to the detective's request to stand up and turn around,
raising no objection to being "patted down." While "consent" was
not an alternative holding, it was an important factor in the court's
conclusion that the search and seizure was reasonable under all the
circumstances. The Superior Court said, "Defendant's compliance and
total failure to raise any objection to the officers' search is virtually
tantamount to consent." " The Superior Court also emphasized the
consensual aspect of the search and seizure in Commonwealth v. One
1955 Buick Sedan."7 When the operator of the motor vehicle was
stopped he merely said, "That's all I have. That's it." From this the
court concluded that "At no time did Scott object to the search of his
car."

98

Similarly, the question of consent has been considered important
in numerous decisions in the Court of Quarter Session of Philadelphia
County. In Commonwealth v. Heninger,99 defendant consented to a
search and seizure, but later argued on his motion to suppress the evidence that real consent could not be given while he was in custody.
94

PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 42, §511 (1930).
95 198 Pa. Super. 47 (1962).
96Id. at 50.
97 198 Pa. Super. 133 (1962).
98 Id.at 136.
99

No. 1582, Oct. 1960 Sess., Philadelphia County, Pa., Q. Sess., Jan 6, 1962.
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The court denied defendant's motion without opinion, presumably on
the ground that consent to the search and seizure had been given. A
motion to suppress has also been denied where petitioner's co-defendant
In Commonwealth v. Donaconsented to the search and seizure.'
hue,' 01 the court gave as one reason for upholding the search and seizure the fact that the officers were invited into the hotel room where the
search and seizure took place.
The consent doctrine may also apply when a seizure of evidence
is made on business premises to which the public is invited. The court
in Commonwealth v. Snead 102 refused to suppress evidence obtained
without a warrant when the police seized certain evidence in the defendant's second-hand store, although the court did suppress evidence
at the same hearing which was obtained from defendant's second floor
apartment. The consent which is present in a public store terminates
when the officers advance beyond the public portion of the premises. 0 3
Consent may also be vitiated if obtained through deception.'
VIII. THE PROCEDURAL PROBLEMS
A. A Rule for PretrialMotions
The procedural entanglements inspired by Mapp have been almost
as troublesome as the substantive issues. Analogizing to Rule 41 (e) of
the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, the District Attorney's Office
immediately took the position that the question of an illegal search and
seizure must be raised by a pretrial motion to suppress the evidence.
Responding to the procedural confusion, the Committee on the
Pennsylvania Rules of Criminal Procedure, which recommends rules
of procedure for promulgation by the appellate courts, drafted suggested rules pertaining to search and seizure. As yet the Pennsylvania
Supreme Court and Superior Court have not acted on the Comnmittee's
recommendations. However, on December 15, 1961, the Court of
Quarter Sessions of Philadelphia County adopted those rules, designated as numbers 100 and 101. Essentially they provide that:
(1) A defendant must move for suppression of evidence
obtained as a result of an illegal search and seizure not later
than 5 days before trial.
100 Commonwealth v. Bonner, No. 1582, Oct. 1960 Sess., Philadelphia County,

Pa.,

Q. Sess., June 22, 1961.
0'oNos. 1390-92, June 1961 Sess., Philadelphia County, Pa., Q. Sess., Dec. 28,

1961.

102 Nos. 1428-44, March 1961 Sess., Philadelphia County, Pa., Q. Sess., March
30, 1962.
103 Commonwealth v. Pittman, No. 988, June 1961 Sess., Philadelphia County,

Pa., Q. Sess., June 15, 1962.
104 Commonwealth v. Wright, Nos. 862-65, Nov. 1961 Sess., Philadelphia County,
Pa., CL Oyer & Terminer, June 8, 1962, appeal docketed, No. 380, Jan. 1962 Sess.,
Pa. Sup. Ct., July 17, 1962. This case is discussed in text accompanying note 48 mepra.
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(2) Motions made later than 5 days before trial will be
entertained only where opportunity therefore did not previously exist, or the defendant was not aware of the ground for
the application, or a prior application for relief had been made
but not finally determined, or the interests of justice require it.
(3) A hearing shall be scheduled on the motion at
which time evidence shall be taken on the factual averments
of the application which are specifically denied by the answer.
(4) If it is determined that evidence was seized in violation of law or the warrant was improperly issued (the warrant
being insufficient on its face; issued without probable cause;
or illegally executed), then the matter shall not be admitted
into evidence and no copy, photograph, reproduction, description, or replica of such property may be admitted into evidence. No testimony or comment shall be received respecting
the evidence.
(5) If the county of seizure is different from the county
of prosecution, the prosecution county shall be bound by and
enforce any order made by a court of the seizure county provided such order commands the return of the property and its
suppression as evidence.
(6) When an application for the suppression of evidence
is made at trial, the trial judge shall hear the application outside the presence of the jury in the first instance, receiving
such evidence as may be necessary for a proper determination
of the issue. If there are disputed issues of fact, the trial
judge shall permit the jury to hear evidence in which case the
matter shall be submitted to the jury for determination as in
the case of disputed confessions in criminal cases, with an appropriate interrogatory to be answered by the jury in the
event a guilty verdict is returned.
B. Decisions in Magistrates' Courts
The adoption of Rules 100 and 101 for Philadelphia County has
been most helpful, but has not fully solved the search and seizure problems arising in the magistrates' courts. The Court of Quarter Sessions
105
is probably without authority to establish rules for the magistrates,
and Rules 100 and 101 do not purport to bind them.
The search and seizure question is frequently raised before the
magistrate at the preliminary hearing which is ordinarily held the
morning after the arrest in one of twelve divisional police courts
throughout the City of Philadelphia. The cry of Mapp v. Ohio is
105

McNair's Petition,

324 Pa. 48, 55, 187 At. 498, 501 (1936).
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raised before the magistrate whenever there is physical evidence, a
police officer who seized it, and most important, a defense counsel to
object to it. Defendants are not represented by counsel in most preliminary hearings, however, so that the magistrates are rarely confronted
with this issue. When they are, the Assistant District Attorney, who
attends all such hearings, is instructed to request that the question not
be ruled upon by the magistrate, who need not be a lawyer, but be reserved for the Court of Quarter Sessions on a motion to suppress pursuant to Rules 100 and 101. The District Attorney's Office has insisted on this position in view of the complicated factual situations and
subtle legal problems which defy solution even after extensive hearings,
analysis, briefing, and legal argument before judges learned in the law.
Nevertheless, magistrates do on occasion suppress evidence at the
preliminary hearing. The rationale for their action, although seldom
expressed and probably less frequently understood, is that a defendant
may be held for action by the grand jury only if competent evidence is
presented at the preliminary hearing. Just as a defendant may not be
properly held for court upon hearsay evidence, so the argument goes,
a magistrate should not hold a defendant if the evidence is not competent because obtained in violation of the due process clause of the
fourteenth amendment.
In those cases in which the magistrate has decided adversely to the
Commonwealth, the District Attorney's Office has a remedy by asking
for a rearrest. In that event, the defendant is brought before a judge
in the Court of Quarter Sessions for a second preliminary hearing.
At that time the judge can rule on the search and seizure question in
virtually the same way as he would were he considering a pretrial motion to suppress. As a discretionary matter, however, the District
Attorney does not seek rearrests in all cases where the magistrate has
discharged the defendant; therefore the dispositive order on the constitutional question of search and seizure is sometimes made by the
magistrate.
C. Burden of Proof on Motions To Suppress
There has been no definitive Pennsylvania decision as to which
party has the burden of proving the constitutionality of the search and
seizure. Since the defendant is the moving party on the application to
suppress, it is logical that the burden should be his, and this is the
existing federal rule. 10 6 There is, however, some basis for the
defense contention that the burden is on the Commonwealth to introduce competent evidence at trial, free from the taint of an illegal search
16 Jones

v. United States, 362 U.S. 257 (1960).

19621

MAPP v. OHIO

and seizure. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court has ruled that the
burden of proof is not on the defendant to establish an alibi, but
rather the overall burden remains upon the Commonwealth to establish its case beyond a reasonable doubt taking into consideration the
alibi defense. The court is required to charge the jury that it may find
a reasonable doubt as to defendant's guilt exists by virtue of the defendant's evidence of alibi, notwithstanding the defendant's failure to
7
prove it by the preponderance of the evidence.
It is doubtful, however, that the alibi analogy would lead a court
to place the burden on the prosecution to prove that evidence was
constitutionally obtained. There is the implicit suggestion in the Superior Court decision in Commonwealth v. Cuff,10 8 that the defendant
has the burden of proving that the search and seizure were unconstitutional. In that case the defendant petitioned to vacate a sentence after
a robbery conviction. The defendant claimed that his arrest resulted
from an illegal seizure of evidence. In denying the petition the court
held that Mapp v. Ohio was not applicable since there was no allegation
that the defendant's conviction was based solely on the allegedly illegally seized evidence. By inference, that case may stand for the
proposition that it is the obligation of the defendant to allege the violation of his constitutional rights and follow up that allegation with
proof, although it is hardly determinative on that issue since it arose
on a post-conviction motion to vacate.
Several rulings by the Court of Quarter Sessions of Philadelphia
County on motions to suppress evidence also indicate that it is the
defendant who has the burden of proof. In Commonwealth v. Magnelli, 0 9 a pretrial motion to suppress was dismissed with prejudice
when defense counsel failed to appear on two consecutive listings of
the case. In two other cases, there were dismissals of motions to suppress evidence, without prejudice, when defense counsel failed to appear."' The application to suppress in Commonwealth v. Bor " was
dismissed without prejudice because no facts were pleaded. These
decisions by the Court of Quarter Sessions indicate that the trial
judges regard it as the obligation of defense counsel to allege and
prove facts in support of motions to suppress evidence.
Commonvealth v. Bonomo, 396 Pa. 222, 151 A.2d 441 (1959).
108 196 Pa. Super. 274, 175 A.2d 136 (1961).
lo 9 Nos. 2040-41, Oct. 1960 Sess., Philadelphia County, Pa., Q. Sess., May 4, 1962.
i10 Commonwealth v. Rementer, No. 1055, Jan. 1962 Sess., Philadelphia County,
Pa., Q. Sess., June 29, 1962; Commonwealth v. Stevenson, No. 509, Feb. 1962 Sess.,
June 22, 1962.
111 Nos. 201-03, July 1961 Sess., Philadelphia County, Pa., Q. Sess., March 9,
1962.
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D. Alternative Proceduresfor Raising Legality of Search and Seizure
Challenges to a search and seizure have been raised by a variety
of procedures in various courts of the Commonwealth. In Commonwealth v. Czajkowski, n" some twelve days before the Mapp decision,
the defendant moved to exclude certain evidence alleging it was obtained under circumstances amounting to an unreasonable search and
seizure. The trial court refused to exclude the evidence and subsequently overruled defendant's motions for new trial and in arrest of
judgment. On appeal, the Pennsylvania Superior Court ruled that the
evidence was obtained legally, thus avoiding the necessity for decision
as to whether defendant employed the proper procedure. However,
the court did comment by way of dictum that the procedural questions
on search and seizure have been left to the states by the Supreme Court
of the United States, and that such objections should be made promptly.
The Superior Court also noted, with apparent approval, the federal procedure under Rule 41 (e) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure
which requires that a motion to suppress evidence be made prior to
trial unless the defendant was unaware of the grounds for such a
motion.
The legality of a search and seizure has also been tested through
a petition for a writ of habeas corpus.11 3 While the defendant was out
on bail after the indictment, defense counsel decided to test the legality
of the seizure of certain evidence. At his request, the court terminated
the defendant's bail and ordered him remanded to custody so that he
would be in a legal position to ask for a writ of habeas corpus. Following the hearing, the court again allowed the defendant to be released on bail pending its decision. Despite the District Attorney's objection to the procedure, the court deemed it permissible for the
defendant to test the search and seizure question by habeas corpus after
surrendering himself, but held that the defendant had acted too late,
because the issue must be raised prior to indictment. The court
buttressed its conclusion by analogy to Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 41 (e). Notwithstanding this procedural ruling, however, the
court considered the case on the merits, concluding that the search
and seizure were reasonable.
In a case involving a pretrial petition which asked that the magistrate's transcript be quashed, the defendant be discharged from the obligation of his bond, and the seized gun be returned, the court-though
expressing doubt that the defendant had taken the proper procedural
198 Pa. Super. 511 (1962).
113 See Commonwealth ex rel. La Camera v. McDougall, No. 108, Dec. 1961
Sess,, Mercer County, Pa., C.P., Nov. 7, 1961.
112
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course, but acting with the consent of the District Attorney-disposed of
the case on the merits as though the petition was properly before it." 4
The constitutionality of the search and seizure was submitted to
the jury in the case of Commonwealth v. Fiorini."5 The jury concluded that the evidence was obtained as a result of a legal search and
seizure and convicted the defendant.
Despite the fact that Philadelphia County has a rule of the Court
of Quarter Sessions requiring that the motion to suppress be made
at least five days before trial, the issue is frequently raised at trial.'
If it appears that the trial judge is disposed to consider the search and
seizure issue at trial, the Assistant District Attorney will ordinarily
object and seek to have defense counsel move to withdraw a juror so
that the question may then be placed as a pretrial motion on the miscellaneous list, to be heard in advance of the next trial listing. If heard
as a pretrial motion, the Commonwealth's right of appeal is preserved.
In at least two cases, this request has been granted." 7
In some situations, the trial court has listened to the defendant's
objection at the time of trial and deferred adjudication on guilt until
a decision was reached on the motion to suppress evidence. This was
the procedure followed in Commonwealth v. Samuels."' After deferring adjudication, the trial judge, sitting without a jury, found the
defendant not guilty in a factual situation which made it clear that the
defendant's motion to suppress was granted. In other cases the trial
courts have refused to consider defendant's motion to suppress at trial
notwithstanding the argument that the Quarter Sessions Rule is ineffectual because a defendant cannot be compelled to waive his constitutional rights. The Philadelphia trial courts have also considered
defendant's search and seizure argument on post-trial motions for a
new trial or in arrest of judgment." 9
Most of the possible procedural problems were raised in the case
of Commonwealth v. Cabey,12 1 in which defendant objected to the
114 Commonwealth v. Griffith, No. 294, May 1962 Sess., Erie County, Pa., Q.
Sess., June 21, 1962.
115 Tried in Berks County, Pa., before Judge Warren K. Hess. This information was provided by Assistant District Attorney Peter Cianci at the District Attorneys' Convention, Galen Hall, July 11, 1962.
116 See Commonwealth v. Katz, No. 611, Dec. 1961 Sess., Philadelphia, Pa.,
County Ct., April 11, 1962; Commonwealth v. Young, No. 315, May 1961 Sess.,
Philadelphia County, Pa., Q. Sess., Jan. 9, 1962.
117 Commonwealth v. Leach, No. 857, Jan. 1961 Sess., Philadelphia County, Pa.,
Q. Sess., March 2, 1962; Commonwealth v. Donohue, Nos. 1390-92, April 1961 Sess.,
Philadelphia County, Pa., Q. Sess., Oct. 9, 1961.
l 18 Nos. 158-61, May 1961 Sess., Philadelphia County, Pa., Q. Sess., Jan. 18, 1962.
119 Commonwealth v. Patrone, 27 Pa. D. & C.2d 343 (Philadelphia County Q.
Sess. 1962); Commonwealth v. Garnett, No. 1293, April 1961 Sess., Philadelphia,
Pa., County Ct., Sept. 18, 1961.
120 Nos. 1003-08, May 1961 Sess., Philadelphia County, Pa., Q. Sess.
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introduction into evidence of a gun seized from a garage which he
rented. The objection was first raised at the magistrate's hearing,
and there overruled. At the first trial, which resulted in a hung jury,
the trial judge sustained the objection of defense counsel to the introduction into evidence of the gun on the ground that the search and
seizure were illegal. At the second trial, before another presiding
judge, the motion of defense counsel to suppress the evidence was
denied; the court stated that its rules required the issue to be raised
by a pretrial motion. When the second trial also ended in a hung
jury, defense counsel filed a pretrial motion to suppress, which was
denied. At the third trial, where the defendant was finally found
guilty, the motion to suppress was again renewed, but was denied on
the ground that the trial court was bound by the pretrial ruling.
E. Appealability
The District Attorney's Office of Philadelphia has been successful
in obtaining a favorable ruling from the Pennsylvania Superior Court
on the important question of the Commonwealth's right to take an
appeal from a pretrial order granting defendant's motion to suppress
evidence. That right of appeal is crucial since the Commonwealth
would be unable to appeal from an acquittal at trial, where the suppressed material left insufficient evidence to warrant a conviction. The
right to appeal from the pretrial suppression order complements the
local Philadelphia rules requiring that all motions to suppress be made
at the pretrial stage. The question of appealability by the defendant
from the refusal of Quarter Sessions to suppress evidence in a pretrial
proceeding, while superficially similar to the appealability by the
Commonwealth from an order suppressing evidence, is realistically different. These two questions were argued and decided on the same day
by the Pennsylvania Superior Court in Commonwealth v. Bosurgi,"1
and Commonwealth v. DiggsY2
After the District Attorney's Office had filed an appeal from the
order suppressing evidence in Bosurgi, defense counsel moved to quash
the appeal on the ground that the order was interlocutory. The Commonwealth relied upon certain pre-Mapp suppression cases,' 2a in which
the Superior Court had ruled that the Commonwealth had the right of
appeal where the order "terminates the prosecution," and "where the
121 198 Pa. Super. 47 (1962), allocatur granted, No. 381, Pa. Sup. Ct., July 17,

1962.
12 2 No. 141, Oct. 1962 Term, Pa. Super. Ct., March 28, 1962.
123 Commonwealth v. Rich, 174 Pa. Super. 174 (1953) ; Commonwealth v. Richardson, 174 Pa. Super. 171, 100 A.2d 155 (1953); Commonwealth v. Montanero, 173
Pa. Super. 133, 96 A.2d 178 (1953).
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return and suppression of evidence are ordered in terms so broad that
the Commonwealth might be prejudiced in an effort to introduce
secondary evidence." 14 Basurgi presented a clear case of inability to
prosecute without items seized as a result of the challenged search.
The defendant contended in his brief and at oral argument that
the pretrial order suppressing evidence was not a final disposition of
the case and therefore the District Attorney should not have the right
of appeal. In support of his position, defendant cited the decision of
the Supreme Court of the United States in DiBella v. United States 2 5
which was handed down a few days before the Bosurgi argument.
DiBella held that the United States Government did not have the right
of appeal from a pre-indictment motion which resulted in quashing
evidence obtained as a result of an unreasonable search and seizure.
The Supreme Court reasoned that the prosecution was no more prejudiced than they would have been as a result of any other adverse
evidentiary ruling during trial.
While the implications of DiBella had not been briefed, the District Attorney's Office argued that the federal law on appealability in
no way affected the identical question in a state court, because of the
language from Mapp: "As is always the case, however, state procedural
requirements governing assertion and pursuance of direct and collateral
constitutional challenges to criminal prosecutions must be respected." "2'
At the oral argument, the Superior Court informally ruled that the
Commonwealth had the right of appeal and proceeded to hear argument on the merits. Later, in its opinion, the court specifically held
that "Where the order suppressing evidence on the ground it was obtained by illegal search and seizure in effect terminates the prosecution,
it is definitive and appealable by the Commonwealth." "2
When the case of Commonwealth v. Diggs " was called for oral
argument a few minutes after the Bosurgi argument was concluded, the
Superior Court considered the right of appeal by a defendant whose pretrial motion to suppress evidence had been denied. In this case it was
the Commonwealth which had filed a motion to quash the appeal on the
ground that the order was interlocutory. The District Attorney's
Office distinguished its right to appeal from that of the defendant on
the ground that the order denying a motion for suppression of evidence
is not a final order as to the defendant since he may continue to trial
and be acquitted. And, if the defendant were convicted, he would then
124

Commonwealth v. Rich, supra note 123, at 178.

125 369 U.S. 121 (1962).

12 6 Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 659 n.9 (1961).
127 198 Pa. Super. at 49.
128 No. 141, Oct. 1962 Term, Pa. Super. Ct., March 28, 1962.
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have the right to appeal and challenge the validity of the ruling on the
search and seizure question. The Superior Court ruled from the bench
that the defendant did not have the right of appeal.
The question of the defendant's right to take an appeal from the
denial of his pretrial motion to suppress evidence was decided by the
Pennsylvania Supreme Court in the unreported case of Commonwealth
v. Borum."29 Borum, one of the defendants in the In Ho Oh killing,
moved to suppress evidence consisting of his trench coat and shoes
which his mother had turned over to detectives shortly after his arrest.
This case was listed for argument at the April, 1962 Term of the Supreme Court. The Commonwealth moved to quash the appeal summarily without oral argument on the same grounds advanced in Diggs,
and the Superior Court's ruling in Diggs was cited as authority.
On April 16, 1962 a per curiam order was entered by the Supreme
Court of Pennsylvania: "Motion granted: appeal quashed."
The Supreme Court will rule on the right of the Commonwealth
to take an appeal from the pretrial order suppressing evidence in two
cases which are listed before that Court for argument in November,
1962. Commonwealth v. Cockfield 130 involves a factual situation where
the lower court suppressed evidence consisting of gasoline and other
inflammable liquids linking the defendant to an arson-murder. In the
case of Commonwealth v. Wright,"' evidence was suppressed consisting of a rag doll stuffed with money taken in the commission of a
robbery-murder. The defense counsel has already filed a motion to
quash the Commonwealth's appeal in Cockfield on the ground that there
is other evidence on which the District Attorney may base his case
including a statement from the defendant. Defense counsel in Wright
has also indicated that a motion to quash the appeal will be filed in
that case. Cockfield and Wright involve more difficult questions on
appealability than did Bosurgi, because the record does not make it
clear that the Commonwealth would be out of court without the suppressed evidence. After the Supreme Court decides these cases, Pennsylvania appellate procedure on search and seizure should be settled.
F. Retroactivity
The most serious possible consequence of Mapp v. Ohio, as far as
the District Attorney is concerned, would be its retroactive application
which would entitle defendants convicted prior to Mapp to obtain
their release from prison. If the rule of Mapp establishes a fundamental
No. 268, Jan. 1962 Term, Pa. Sup. Ct., April 16, 1962.
Nos. 688-94, May 1960 Sess., Philadelphia County, Pa., Q. Sess., appeal
docketed, No. 379, Jan. 1962 Sess., Pa. Sup. Ct., July 19, 1962.
131 Nos. 862-65, Nov. 1961 Sess., Philadelphia County, Pa., Q. Sess., June 8,
1962, appeal docketed, No. 380, Jan. 1962 Sess., Pa. Sup. Ct., July 17, 1962.
129
130
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constitutional right, the issue might be raised by a habeas corpus proceeding. But the time for raising the search and seizure question may
be considered procedural. If so, then there is substantial authority that
it is for state determination. The Supreme Court of the United States
has said:
The Due Process Clause has never been perverted so as
to force upon the forty-eight states a uniform code of criminal
procedure. Except for the limited scope of the Federal criminal code, the prosecution of crimes is a matter for the individual States. The Constitution commands the states to assure fair judgment. Procedural details for securing fairness
it leaves to the states. It is for them, therefore, to choose the
methods and practices by which the crime is brought to book,
of man which
so long as they observe those ultimate dignities
32
the United States Constitution assures.1

The doctrine that procedural questions iemain for state determination
may be carried over to the retroactive application of the exclusionary
rule in Mapp.'"
Relying on the edicts in Carterand Mapp that a state may decide
its own procedural questions, the Pennsylvania Superior Court has refused to apply Mapp in a number of situations on procedural grounds.
Commonwealth ex rel. Marshall v. Maroney 134 involved a petition
for a writ of habeas corpus where the defendant sought to upset a judgment of conviction entered after a plea of guilty on the ground that
narcotics found in his possession resulted from an illegal search and
seizure. The Superior Court ruled that habeas corpus could not be
used to challenge the legality of the conviction since the quality of the
evidence was not in issue on the guilty plea. While not specifically set
forth, the rationale may also be based, at least in part, on the principle
that trial errors may be raised only on appeal and not by habeas corpus.
A somewhat different procedure was employed in Commonwealth
v. Cuff, 13 5 which concerned a petition to vacate a sentence on the
ground that the defendant's arrest resulted from an illegal seizure of
evidence. Ruling specifically that Mapp v. Ohio did not apply since
there was no allegation that the illegally seized evidence was the basis
of the conviction, the court also implied that the search and seizure
question was raised too late.
The Pennsylvania Superior Court has refused to apply Mapp
where the search and seizure question was not raised in post-trial moCarter v. Illinois, 329 U.S. 173, 175 (1946).
133 See generally Bender, The Retroactive Effect of at Overruling Constitutional Decision: Mapp v. Ohio, 110 U. PA. L. REv. 650 (1962).
132

134 198
135

Pa. Super. 85 (1962).
196 Pa. Super. 274, 175 A2d 136 (1961).
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tions. In Commonwealth v. Clark,13 the search, seizure, trial and conviction occurred prior to June 19, 1961, the day Mapp was decided.
Defendant made no pretrial motions attacking the validity of the search
and seizure. At the trial, however, defense counsel made an oral motion
to exclude narcotics on the ground they were obtained through an
illegal search and seizure. The court denied the motion. After the
defendant was convicted, post-trial motions in arrest of judgment and
for a new trial were filed, but those motions raised no question concerning the evidence obtained through the alleged illegal search and seizure.
The post-trial motions were dismissed by the Court of Quarter Sessions
of Allegheny County in an opinion filed on July 18, 1961 which was followed by an effort by defense counsel on August 14, 1961 to raise
again the search and seizure question. The effort was unsuccessful and
on August 18, 1961 sentence was imposed from which an appeal was
taken to the Superior Court.
Upholding the judgment, the Pennsylvania Superior Court
squarely ruled that the question could not be considered on appeal because it was not properly raised in the court below. It has long been a
firm procedural ruling by the Pennsylvania appellate courts that matters not raised by proper post-conviction motions cannot be invoked
on appeal even though constitutional questions may be involved. The
Superior Court specificaly held that Mapp v. Ohio did not require a
contrary conclusion since the question was essentially procedural.
There is a hint in the opinion of the Pennsylvania Superior Court
in Comnmonwealth v. Campbell,'137 that Mapp would be applied retroactively if the issue was properly raised in the trial court. At the trial,
which occurred prior to June 19, 1961, the court had ruled that defense
counsel could not cross-examine on the question of probable cause for
the issuance of a search warrant. That ruling was assigned as error
in light of the Mapp decision which intervened between trial and appeal. The Superior Court held that there was no error, but stated:
This contention would be meritorious if illegality in obtaining the search warrant had been shown. However, there
is nothing in the record to show illegality. During the course
of the trial, counsel for defense in his cross-examination of
the police officer who obtained the warrant, indicated that he
was not attacking its legality but merely attempting to show
bias . . . . The questions of counsel elicited no showing
of illegality .
.
38
136 198 Pa. Super. 64 (1962).
137 196 Pa. Super. 380, 175 A.2d 324 (1961),
WEEK 3376 (U.S. May 11, 1962) (No. 961).
138 Id. at 387. 175 A.2d at 328.

petition for cert. filed. 30 U.S.L.
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Implicit in the language is the suggestion that Mapp might have been
applied under that chronology had lack of probable cause been established at trial, or had defense counsel insisted on cross-examining on
probable cause for the purpose of showing that the search and seizure
were unlawful.
The issue of retroactive application of Mapp was raised in a unique
factual situation in Commonwealth v. Mancini, 3 where a crucial date
in the case history fell on the same day Mapp was decided. After trial,
which occurred prior to the Mapp decision, adjudication was deferred
by the judge, sitting without a jury. On June 19, 1961-the same day
the Supreme Court handed down the decision in Mapp-the defendant
was found guilty. Motions for a new trial and in arrest of judgment
were then filed on June 21, 1961, but it was not until October 13, 1961,
that defendant's counsel sought to raise the illegality of the search and
seizure which produced the evidence leading to the defendant's conviction. The trial court refused to consider the search and seizure question and denied the post-trial motions. The Court of Quarter Sessions
of Philadelphia County also refused to apply the exclusionary rule on
the ground that the trial was held prior to the Mapp decision, and defendant did not properly raise the constitutional issue since he failed to
challenge the legality of the search warrants at trial. As this Article
was going to press, the Superior Court affirmed this decision, holding
that Mapp is not to be applied retroactively.14
IX.

EVALUATION

A. The Effect of the Policy Debate on State Court
Implementation of Mapp
Like many of its current decisions, the ruling of the Supreme
Court of the United States in Mapp was based on considerations of public policy rather than on legal precedents. While it is virtually certain
that the exclusionary rule will not soon be reversed regardless of the
arguments advanced, its underlying policy considerations are important
in analyzing the application of the doctrine by the state courts. It is
to be expected that the application of a rule from which many dissent
on policy grounds may be substantially different from the implementation of a law on which there is general agreement.
139 Nos. 317-23, Dec. 1960 Sess., Philadelphia County, Pa., Q. Sess., May 25,

1962.
140

No. 496, Pa. Super. Ct., Sept. 13, 1962. In another case, the Court of Common

Pleas of Philadelphia County squarely ruled that Mapp is not retroactive.

The

Superior Court dismissed the appeal on the ground that the petition did not set forth
substantial questions of fact or law.

Commonwealth ex rel. Altizer v. Hendrick,

No. 2392, Dec. 1961 Term, Philadelphia County, Pa., C.P., March 20, 1962, appeal
dwnsissed, No. 262, Pa. Super. Ct., Sept. 13, 1962.
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State courts, especially those at the trial level, tend to place
greater emphasis on law enforcement and community interest than on
the protection of individuals' civil liberties. It is difficult to determine
whether that approach was the parent or the child of the Supreme
Court's greater stress on civil liberties. It may partially explain the
initial reaction of the state courts to limit the exclusionary rule by
liberally defining the scope of "reasonable" search and seizure. This
inclination of the state courts to afford law enforcement officials latitude manifests an implicit conviction that the public welfare requires
limitations on the Mapp doctrine. The state courts cannot repudiate
Mapp, but they can take the broadest view of the bounds of reasonableness.
Some of the resentment to Mapp arises from the manner in which
the exclusionary rule was imposed upon the states. The objection is
frequently raised that a sudden change on such a fundamental evidentiary question is properly a legislative, rather than a judicial function. Congress and state assemblies are better equipped to hear evidence, weigh the relevant considerations, and express the will of the
people on such a matter of public policy. This concept was cogently
expressed by Judge Burton R. Laub, when he applied the Mapp doctrine in a criminal case in Erie County, Pennsylvania:
Even if it be conceded that the exclusionary rule is salutary, it is doubtful whether a constitutional provision should
be made self-executing by the short form of amendment which
Mapp used. If experience has demonstrated that civil remedies have been ineffectual to dissuade the police from illegal
searches and seizures, this is a matter for the Congress and
the State Legislatures to redress, for it is to these bodies that
the lawmaking power has been delegated. If criminal or
other sanctions should be adopted to implement the Constitution, the legislative branches of the government are adequately
equipped with the power to do so.1 4'
The procedure used by the Court is further subject to question since,
as Justice Harlan's dissent states, the Court "reached out" to decide
this question without full briefing and argument.' 4 2 However, in view
of the plainly held views of the other justices, expressed in many prior
decisions, it is highly improbable that the decision would have been
different had a more appropriate case been awaited.
The state courts' reluctance to honor Mapp fully also stems from
the deepseated conviction that the arguments against the exclusionary
141 Commonwealth v. Griffith, No. 294, May 1962 Sess., Erie County, Pa., Q.
Sess., June 21, 1962, p. 2 n.3.
142 367 U.S. at 674 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
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rule are still compelling, notwithstanding the Supreme Court's contrary conclusion. These jurists believe that the citizen's freedom was
more secure before Mapp than after; that it is more important to be
free from the aggressive burglar, robber, and rapist than it is to be free
from the aggressive policeman. From the local viewpoint, an innocent
citizen on the street at night should be-willing to suffer the personal inconvenience of being stopped and searched by a policeman if a similar
search of the felon will save him from the much greater discomfort of
being the criminal's next victim. In brief, the advantage of greater
latitude for policemen in apprehending offenders outweighs the value
of marginal protection of civil liberties. It is more important to convict
the guilty than to prevent the unconstitutional search and seizure of the
innocent which is only unpleasant. This is not to gainsay the strong
arguments behind the Mapp doctrine. Outrageous searches should be
eliminated; and civil and criminal remedies may be ineffective against
offending officers. A civil judgment is often uncollectible because the
offending officer is execution-proof; criminal sanctions will seldom be
initiated against the officer by other law enforcers. It is further contended that the courts and responsible law enforcement officers should
not be a party to conduct which violates the Constitution. Police who
enforce state laws can gather evidence without conducting unreasonable searches and seizures just as their federal counterparts have learned
to do. Society will be ultimately benefited by elevating civil liberties
over police powers. Like the contrary contentions, these arguments
rest more on visceral reactions than on demonstrable evidence. Such
absolute concepts, narrowmindedly urged by extremists on either side
of the issue, create prejudice, not progress.
The assistant district attorney, who works closely with the police,
is disposed to favor broader police powers. They make his job easier.
The police, who have his ear, are outraged by the new law of search
and seizure which makes their job so much more difficult. But in attempting an impartial evaluation, I would immediately reject the
tendency of some Mapp supporters to equate the policy of exclusion with
the philosophy behind the presumption of innocence and the requirement that the prosecution prove its case beyond a reasonable doubt.
The burden-of-proof rule and presumption of innocence are grounded
on the often-repeated concept that it is better to let ten guilty men go
free than to punish one innocent person. With this no one disagrees.
The imprisonment of an innocent man is so repulsive a consequence that
we would prefer to free many guilty men. But the same pulls are not
generated by the search and seizure question. While it is unpleasant
for an innocent citizen to be subjected to an unreasonable search and
seizure, the consequence is not nearly so dire as sending an innocent
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man to jail. This difference should be kept in mind in evaluating the
type of search and seizure which should be classified as "unconstitutional" so as to acquit the guilty.
The conflicting philosophies of search and seizure can probably
be best reconciled by observing the strict mandate of Mapp, while allowing state courts substantial latitude in establishing standards of reasonableness. In that way the guilty will be acquitted only when they are
victims of extreme searches, and there will be effective protection
against reprehensible police practices. Civil liberties will be substantially elevated immediately, while the officer's latitude in conducting a
search will be constricted gradually as police learn the subtleties of
Mapp.
B. The Cost of Mapp
There can be no doubt that the Mapp decision has significantly
impaired the ability of the police to secure evidence to convict the guilty.
How detrimental this has been, however, is a matter of opinion rather
than demonstrable fact. Unfortunately, it is impossible to determine
with accuracy how much privacy has been promoted and how seriously
police work has been hampered. It is my opinion that the police have
been seriously handicapped by the exclusionary rule in the first year
after Mapp. The right to privacy has not been significantly promoted
during that time since the police have not fully understood and hence
not fully complied with the Mapp rule. Initially, the only beneficiary
has been the acquitted criminal. But in the future it is probable that
altered police practices will enhance the right of privacy and the police
should learn to function reasonably well within the confines of the exclusionary rule. Nevertheless, it is inevitable that Mapp will result in
permanently eliminating some practices which have been effective
against the criminal.
It is probable that many crimes are prevented by police in a city
like Philadelphia by the "routine" car or person stop which so often
results in the seizure of a fully loaded revolver in the hands of a man
with a record of crimes of violence. The police ordinarily exercise discretion in making these stops by limiting them to nighttime in sections
of the city where strongarm robberies are frequent. This type of preventive law enforcement is precluded by Mapp. The law abiding citizen who must walk on some Philadelphia streets at two o'clock in the
morning would doubtless prefer to be subjected to a search, without any
cause, and have the police do the same to the man standing idly at a
corner; but that cannot be done under Mapp. Here again the best solution lies in liberal construction of what is a reasonable search and
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seizure, depending on factors which are well known to local judges,
as well as local police.
C. The Proper Application of Mapp
The history of the exclusionary rule, policy considerations, and
practical problems of law enforcement dictate that the state courts
should be given extensive latitude in deciding what is a reasonable
search and seizure. Mapp, which dealt with an admittedly unconstitutional seizure, held only that evidence must be excluded in a state
criminal trial if it was unreasonably seized. The step-by-step approval
from Weeks through Wolf to Irvine to Mapp shows that the Supreme
Court deliberately did not impose on the states the federal standards of
"reasonableness," but left that determination to the states, at least for
the time being.
The major differences in law enforcement problems among the
states support a policy that would allow the reasonableness of the
seizure to be determined by local standards. Police problems also vary
enormously within the same state. The problems in Philadelphia
County are vastly different from those in Bradford County, Pennsylvania. At the Pennsylvania District Attorneys' Association Conference, held on July 9 through 11, 1962, most of the county prosecutors
stated that they had not been confronted with a single problem on
search and seizure in the year after the adoption of the exclusionary rule
in Mapp. On the other hand, metropolitan areas like Pittsburgh and
Philadelphia have been inundated with search and seizure questions.
At least until the police have an opportunity to absorb the subtleties of the exclusionary rule, law enforcement in the metropolitan areas
requires that searches be justifiable upon a lesser showing of cause than
that necessary to justify arrest. A search should be deemed constitutional if the officer has cause to suspect that the defendant has committed an offense. But Pennsylvania law provides that a misdemeanant
can be arrested only if the officer saw him commit the offense. If
Mapp required the imposition of the federal rule that a search without
a warrant must be incidental to a valid arrest, an officer who had not
seen an offense committed would be precluded from searching an
individual, even though he had good cause to believe that a misdemeanor had been perpetrated. Such a result is most undesirable in a
large city with a crime problem. Nor should the search of a felon
depend on whether the officer has reason to believe that the felony has
been committed and this is the man. It should be sufficient for the
officer to have some justifiable basis to suspect the defendant. Then,
if the search reveals incriminating evidence, the defendant can be
arrested.
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Similarly, the police should not be held to technical requirements
on the contents of the search warrant. The essential question is
whether the officer has probable cause to obtain the warrant, which information may be transmitted to the magistrate orally or in writing.
The position that the officer must set forth in the warrant all the factors
leading to the conclusion of probable cause is presumably asserted as
the only way to test the officer's credibility. But honesty of the police
and the ability of defense counsel to elicit the truth by cross-examination
should be ample safeguards to insure credible testimony on probable
cause. The problem of perjured testimony on this issue is certainly
less substantial than the disadvantage of requiring that the police be
expert draftsmen of the affidavit.
The fallacy in requiring great detail in the affidavit is illustrated
by considering two opinions of the Court of Quarter Sessions of
Philadelphia County which were handed down within a few days of
each other in June, 1962. In Commonwealth v. Tanner,143 the
court suppressed evidence because of insufficient facts in the affidavit
despite its finding that the officers did in fact have probable cause to
obtain the search warrant. In the case of Commonwealth v. Silverberg,'4 4 the validity of the search and seizure without a warrant was
upheld because the officer had probable cause to make the search, notwithstanding the fact that he had ample time to obtain a warrant before the search and seizure were made. On these rulings, an officer
would be well advised to refrain from obtaining a warrant, and to set
forth his probable cause at the time of the hearing on defendant's
motion to suppress. Acting without a warrant, the officer would not
be precluded from testifying as to the details of probable cause, whereas
in Tanner, the officer was not permitted to augment the written affidavit with oral evidence. This anomalous consequence can easily be
avoided by focusing on the essential question: did the officer have probable cause to obtain the warrant when he did so. Regardless of who
has the burden of proving that the search and seizure were unreasonable, the officer should not be required to set forth details of his probable cause until the hearing on that question. If the burden lies on
the defendant to prove the unconstitutionality of the search and seizure,
then the absence of such oral testimony would result in the presumption of propriety attaching to the warrant.
The state courts should enjoy considerable latitude in interpreting
the doctrine of consent, the range of validity of a warrant, and the
permissible scope of a search. The authority of the state courts to
143 Nos. 2459-61, Jan. 1962 Sess., Philadelphia County, Pa., Q. Sess., June 21,

1962, appeal docketed, No. 321, Oct. 1962 Sess., Pa. Super. Ct., June 22, 1962.
144 No. 1586, April 1962 Sess., Philadelphia County, Pa., Q. Sess., June 18, 1962.
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establish their own procedural rules on issues such as the time for
raising the search and seizure issue, retroactivity, and appellate procedures should likewise be respected.
D. Conclusion
Extrapolating from the history of constitutional controversy, it
seems safe to predict that the Supreme Court, through the due process
clause of the fourteenth amendment, will ultimately impose upon all the
states uniform criminal procedures for important questions. As Mapp
has impressed the exclusionary rule upon all the states, a future decision
will probably provide that all defendants in state criminal proceedings
are entitled to counsel. In the long run such extensions of civil rights
have generally proved beneficial.
The movement toward uniformity in state criminal proceedings
has, however, serious disadvantages. The community pays a high price
in less effective law enforcement by elevating the right of privacy over
the police power. No empirical weights can be ascribed on the scales
of justice to the values of civil liberties versus police power. In reconciling the two, over a year's experience with the exclusionary rule in a
major metropolitan area teaches only that there is no confident conclusion.
While there must be changes in constitutional doctrine, long
standing police practices should not be violently uprooted. State
prosecution procedures should be accomodated to the greatest extent
possible under the revised letter of the law. It is probable that the
Supreme Court will ultimately impose fully federal standards for search
and seizure on the states; but until the police have had a reasonable
opportunity to absorb the subtleties of probable cause and the requisites of a warrant, the states should have the maximum degree of latitude in deciding what is a constitutional search and seizure.

